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In the past tw o decades th roughou t the 
“Third W orld” many governm ents have come 
to  pow er w h ich  have a d o p te d  ra d ica l 
measures, nationalis ing most if not v irtua lly all 
o f the ir country 's econom y, carry ing out a 
radical land reform, breaking w ith imperialism  
and procla im ing a socia list objective.
Yet these regimes have not taken power as 
the result o f a socia list revolution or even in 
most cases through a national liberation 
revolution. Nor are they led by Com m unist 
Parties or parties cla im ing to  be w orking class 
or socialist.
As often as not, they have seized power in a 
m ilita ry coup, led by le ft-leaning, nationalist 
o ff ic e rs  s icke n e d  by th e  c o rru p tio n , 
subservience and lack of progress of neo­
colonial regimes.
W hile it is d ifficu lt to  generalise, these 
developments pose im portant questions fo r 
marxists, and it is necessary to try to situate 
t h e m  w i t h i n  a t h e o r e t i c a l  
fra m e w o rk .M o re o v e r, w ith  P apua-N ew  
Guinea moving towards independence, and 
Indonesia a close neighbour, such problems 
are not isolated from our day-to-day struggle.
The N asser 1952 R e v o lu tio n  and its 
subsequent evolution provides som ething of a 
case-history, a lthough it was specific to  Egypt 
in many respects. The present Peruvian, 
Somali and Congo-Brazzaville governments; 
he Syrian and Iraki Baathist regimes and the 
\lge rian  m ilitary governm ent are some of 
hose "Nasser-type” regimes which spring 
eadily to mind. O ther variants are the 
anzanian governm ent and the form er 
Jkhrumah regime in Ghana.
In Egypt, Somalia, Peru, etc. (what may be 
termed the ‘‘Nasser m odel"), progressive 
o fficers took power from  co rrup t bourgeois 
reg im es w h ic h , a lth o u g h  so m e tim e s  
preserving the facade of parliam entary 
democracy, were crudely m anipulated by 
imperialism.
In the “ Tanzanian m odel” , governm ents 
c o m in g  to  po w e r a fte r a s tru g g le  fo r  
independence have gradually progressed to 
radical econom ic reform, after internal 
struggles inside the ruling party.
Attem pts so far made to give a theoretica l 
de fin ition to these types of regimes have, in my 
opin ion, failed. This includes descrip tions by 
Soviet and Chinese ideologists. They cannot, 
of course, considerthem  to be “soc ia lis t” , if fo r 
no other reason than that this w ould raise 
questions as to the ir own versions o f m arxist 
theory. Their de fin itions have therefore varied, 
often in response to the needs of d ip lom acy 
and foreign policies. Most frequently  they 
have described “ Nasser model" regimes as 
“countries on the non-capita lis t road” . As that 
only defines what they are not, it begs the 
question.
Another com m on defin ition  speaks of them 
as countries of “ national dem ocracy” . But 
trad itiona lly, “ national dem ocracy" is the 
regime of the national bourgeoisie, w hile “ New 
D em ocracy” was the term used to describe 
China im m ediately after the revolution. China 
was then in the process o f rapid change to the 
total overthrow  of capita lism , but maintained 
certain cap ita lis t econom ic and other vestiges 
to ease the transition. The countries we are 
describ ing fit in to neither of these categories.
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From  o th e r New Le ft o r n e o -m a o is t 
theoreticians, including the marxist left 
oppositions in som eofthesecoun tries  (Egypt, 
Tanzania, etc.) descriptions range from 
"bureaucratic cap ita lis t” and “ sta tecap ita lis t” , 
to even the “d icta torsh ip  of the petty 
bourgeoisie” . The th ird is comm on though 
rather crudely summarised above. It is, 
however, untenable either from the viewpoint 
of marxist theory or concrete analysis. We will 
return to the confusion surrounding th is “ petty 
bourgeoisie” later.
The firs t two merit more attention, but both 
are also greatly confused and mixed up w ith 
more trad itiona l descriptions of “state 
cap ita lism ” from  Lenin and Marx, as well as 
w ith the “ restoration ist” maoist thesis that 
“cap ita lism ” was restored in the Soviet Union 
under Khrushchev.
The discussion suffers from a number of 
m ethodological errors: first, the obsession to 
fit a de fin ition  of a government or state in to  a 
few words, be they “socia list coun tries” , 
“ socialist-based countries” , “ degenerated 
workers' states” , “state cap ita lism ” , or what 
you w ill. Such descriptions are probably 
necessary fo r journa lis tic  purposes, but 
involve the risk of abstract and futile  
term inological debate.
Second, such terms are used fo r abuse or 
praise, depending on politica l viewpoint.
Third, and most important, they lack the 
essential h istorical approach. That is, the 
evolution of such a regime is not seen in an 
h is to r ic a l c o n te x t, b u t s ta t ic a lly , in a 
socio logical view which isolates them in a 
moment in time.
This is a comm on structura list error, 
in fecting the A lthusserian marxists as well.
Fourth, the discussion is particu larly 
bedevilled by being abstracted from  the 
international context in which these countries 
have evolved.
These last two points need elaboration prior 
to a more detailed exam ination of the 
theoretical problems.
THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT
The Colonial Revolution has been the 
hallmark of the post-W orld War II period. The 
stabilisation of West European capitalism  after 
1948 and the beginning of the Cold War froze 
so c ia l re v o lu tio n a ry  de ve lop m e n ts  in 
advanced capita lis t countries fo r decades.
While stalinism  and the bureaucratic
d ictatorship remained v irtua lly  unshaken until 
the m id-fifties in eastern Europe, rapid 
e co n o m ic  p ro g re ss  o c c u rre d , w ith  a 
corresponding growth in m ilita ry power, 
c o u n te r-b a la n c in g  the  a rm ed m ig h t of 
imperialism.
The Chiriese and Vietnamese Revolutions 
also set a model fo r countries in a s im ilar 
socio-econom ic situation. They, together with 
the Korean people, showed how poverty, 
hunger and oppression could be overcome 
relatively qu ick ly  w ith a socialised econom y 
and a com m unist leadership.
F o llo w in g  S ta lin ’s de a th , d ip lo m a tic  
overtures from Khrushchev and Chou En-lai, 
began to w a rd s  leaders  o f the  n e w ly - 
independent countries, particu la rly  Sukarno, 
Nehru and Nasser. These approaches, 
highlighted by the 1955 Bandung Conference 
and the developm ent of the “ neutralist b loc" 
were accompanied by often uncritica l praise 
and g lo rifica tion  of such leaders.
But, leaving this aside, the period from  1955 
to the present has been marked by a grow ing 
influence by both the Soviet Union and China 
in the “Third W orld” , a w illingness on the ir part 
to help w ith often substantial aid, and the 
grow ing attraction of vaguely socia list ideas in 
general.
The v ic to ry  o f the  C uban  S o c ia lis t 
Revolution by 1961 added a new dimension. 
The success of a national liberation struggle in 
a small nation under the nose of US 
imperialism was s ign ifican t enough: its 
transform ation into a socia lis t revolution and 
the fa ilure of attempts by US im peria lism  to 
crush it were even more sign ificant.
The continued battle of the Indochinese 
revolutions, w inning victories over the most 
ba rb a rou s  agg re ss io n  by im p e ria lis m , 
increased the stature of socia list revolution in 
the Third World. Yugoslavia, both socia list and 
neutralist, presented an increasingly attractive 
model to revolutionary nationa list forces.
To nationalist leaders, in tent on bu ild ing a 
strong and independent country, the success 
of China, Vietnam, North Korea and Cuba, and 
to a lesser extent (because of its “ European” 
c o n te x t) the  S ov ie t U n io n , o ffe re d  an 
alternative to the blind alley of dependence on 
imperialism.
After some time in power, such nationalist 
leaders saw that the local bourgeoisie - 
whether “ com pradore” or “ nationa l” - was 
incapable of effecting any econom ic advance 
able to provide the base fo r a strong army and
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state. The success of nationalised, planned 
economies in China, Cuba, etc. seemed to do 
so. It would be necessary, of course, to 
become “socia list" but not “ com m unist” . 
While the more reactionary aspects, fo r 
example of Islam, would have to be combatted, 
the basic allegiance of the masses to such 
religions could be com bined into an “ Islamic 
s o c ia lis m ”  o r a “ B u d d h is t s o c ia lis m ” 
etc.Moreover, the com petition between the 
im perialist powers and the Soviet Union and 
China, and between the latter two as well, 
could allow  these nationa list leaders to play 
one o ff against the other, providing a real 
independence and substantial aid from  both 
blocs.
Lastly, such a balancing act could also 
provide justifica tion  fo r the regime to crush 
opposition both from  the bourgeoisie and 
from the w orking class, contain them and 
m obilise them around nationalist goals, 
including the tasks of the nationalised 
economies.
The ab ility  of nationalist leaderships to 
exp lo it the differences between the blocs and 
take power in to the ir own hands depends, 
historically, on the weakness of the tw o major 
indigenous classes in the colonia l o r neo­
c o lo n ia l so c ie tie s  - the  b o u rg e o is ie , 
encapsulated in a dependent re lationship w ith 
imperial ism, anxious only fo r easy, speculative 
profits as opposed to capital investment in 
heavy industry, and tied by athousand threads 
to the semi-feudal landed class; and the 
p r o le t a r ia t ,  w e a k  b e c a u s e  o f  th e  
underdevelopment of industry due to the 
subservience of the local bourgeoisie to 
im p e ria lism . In m ost o f the  c o u n tr ie s  
concerned, the w orking class is very small 
compared w ith the peasant masses and also 
unorganised.
The nationalist leaderships therefore 
balance in a “ bonapartist” way between 
imperialism and the “ socia list b loc” ; between 
the Soviet Union and China; between the local 
bourgeoisie and the w orking class; between 
the varying factions of the educated elite.
NATIONALIST LEADERSHIPS:
“ PETTY BOURGEOIS” OR BUREAUCRACY?
So far, we have spoken rather loosely of 
“ nationalist leaderships". This is clearly 
insu ffic ient as a precise social defin ition. What 
is needed is an analysis of the state in these 
countries. Here again, confusion reigns. The 
debate summarised by John S. Paul in the 
Socialist Register 1974 is w itness to this.
This is, in turn, linked w ith the debate about 
the role of the “ petty bourgeoisie” in these 
form er colonia l societies.
The petty bourgeoisie was a term used by 
Marx and Engels fo r quite specific social 
strata. It, above all, referred to the peasantry, 
both in pre-capita list and early post-capita list 
society. In addition, it covered the small 
shopkeepers, self-em ployed professionals 
and handicraft artisans. “ Petty bourgeois 
socialism ” referred to the specific dreams and 
goa ls  o f these  laye rs , p a r t ic u la r ly  the  
peasantry.
Both Marx and Lenin stressed the inab ility  of 
the peasantry and other petty bourgeois layers 
to take power into the ir own hands, and thus 
the need fo r a worker-peasant alliance, under 
w orking class leadership. Basically, there is in 
the debate, a confusion between the petty- 
bourgeoisie and the state bureaucracy.
D iscu ss io n  o f “ the  b u re a u c ra c y "  is 
forbidden ground fo r those who draw 
inspiration from the sta lin ist trad ition. The 
bureaucracy even in capita list states can 
ach ieve, and does o ften  ach ieve , an 
autonom ous role. Marx very clearly stated this 
in the Eighteenth Brumaire and fo r him the 
fu r th e s t e x te n t o f th is  a u to n o m y  was 
bonapartism in France. In the “asiatic mode of 
p roduction", and “caesarism” , the state had 
even more autonomy.
Leon Trotksy adapted and developed the 
marxist thesis on bureaucracy to explain the 
rise of the sta lin ist d ictatorship. In his major 
work The Revolution Betrayed this analysis 
was made subtly w ith a feel fo r the nuances of 
the bureaucracy. In subsequent works it was 
sim plified, then d istorted out of recognition by 
many of his “ fo llow ers” .
W hat is the  d iffe re n c e  betw een the 
bureaucracy and the petty bourgeoisie? “ Petty 
bourgeoisie” should be stric tly  used by 
marxists fo r the self-em ployed, those who 
work themselves, w ith the ir fam ilies and 
perhaps a few others. The petty bourgeois has 
the am bition of becoming a fu lly-fledged 
bourgeois.
Even so, such a defin ition covers w idely 
disparate layers, w ith little  else in common: 
from professional lawyers, already close to  the 
bourgeoisie, to  poor peasants and even semi­
proletarian peasants, to  the poverty-stricken 
cobbler, barely surviving.
Army officers oo not form  a part of th is petty- 
bourgeoisie, by any s tric t defin ition, though
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they may have petty bourgeois orig ins and 
ideas.
The bureaucracy - the people w ith decis ion­
making power in the state apparatus (army 
and police officers, heads of departments, 
m inisters, party o ffic ia ls when the party is 
identified w ith the state, technocrats, etc.) - 
form s a separate social stratum, linked w ith 
d ifferent, usually ruling, classes, but w ith its 
own autonom ous existence, privileges and 
interests.
The bureaucracy, particu larly in form er 
colonia l countries is not homogeneous, but 
reflects, often in a distorted manner, the 
collective needs of d ifferent classes. But it has 
elements and layers who seek to get beyond 
“ narrow class interests” and, w ith in a more 
general (class) philosophical and nationalist 
view, develop the total progress of the 
“ nation” .
The state in form er colonia l countries is, fo r 
the most part, more “ h ighly developed” than 
any of the indigenous classes. This derives 
from the need of the form er colonial powers, 
both before and after “ independence” to have 
a strong state - bureaucracy, includ ing armed 
forces - to suppress movements fo r national 
liberation and class struggle.
Though even th is is not always the case. In 
Tanzania, and particu la rly  Zanzibar, the state 
was weak, while all classes were also 
underdeveloped. In Zanzibar, the state 
consisted o f a hundred policemen. Insurgent 
workers could then seize the ir arms and make 
a revolution.
In other countries, such as Egypt, the 
im peria list need fo r a strong repressive 
apparatus was reinforced by the existing 
“sem i-feudal” state, already powerful before 
the country was conquered.
While the "native” colonia l bureaucracy 
through education and experience, is tied 
d irectly  to the econom ic colonial order, it has 
in -bu ilt grievances, particu larly due to 
expatriates hold ing the top positions under 
d irect co lon ia l rule. Sectors of th is “ old 
b u re a u c ra c y ”  m ay th e re fo re  a d o p t a 
nationalist stance, and jo in nationalist 
movements, seeing themselves as the natural 
ru le rs  a fte r in d e p e n d e n ce , w hen the  
bureaucracy is to be “ localised” .
Nationalist movements are often led by 
elements from  m iddle or lower rank cadres of 
the old bureaucracy, who have been educated 
abroad and there absorbed from the post-war
world context a knowledge of nationalist 
ideology and practice.
Sometimes the nationalist movement may 
spring from outside the old bu reaucracy-from  
the  m e rch a n t c lass, the  p ro fe s s io n a ls  
(lawyers, etc.) and the m inute “ national 
bourgeoisie” .
But in that case, the movem ent is entrapped 
in the class lim its of the local bourgeoisie, 
which fears the masses whom they must 
mobilise to some degree if they are to achieve 
the ir own goals. C olonialism , realising the ir 
inherent weaknesses, w ill often co -op t th is 
lo ca l b o u rg e o is ie  in to  a p a r t ic ip a to ry  
framework w ith in  the co lon ia l system, or in 
later decolonisation hand power over to them 
before any real struggle occurs.
Nationalist movements led by younger 
bureaucrats or by young professionals and ex­
students who go almost im m ediately into 
v irtually fu ll-tim e politica l activ ity, are more 
capable of mass m obilisation, even if these are 
loosely organised, and develop an alternative 
movement structure to the old colonial 
bureaucracy, ready to take it over. The young 
professionals and ex-students who jo in  w ith 
bureaucrats in such a m ovem ent’s leadership 
are not in fact fa r removed from  them: the ir 
prim ary aim is also state power - that is, 
“ parachuting" to the top of the bureaucracy.
But w ith in such movements, left and right 
w ings are always present in nascent form, 
from the beginning. This results from  the 
differing am bitions of those taking part. The 
“ righ t” aim to transform  themselves rapidly 
into a true bourgeoisie, through exp lo itation of 
fu tu re  pow e r p o s it io n s  in the  s ta te  
bureaucracy. The other, “ le ft” w ing, is 
concerned w ith power itself, to develop the 
"na tion ” , to  modernise and build  astrong state 
apparatus and gain real independence. 
Secondary, a lthough not neglected, is the 
desire to gain a com fortable life-style.
It is d ifficu lt to d istinguish between the two 
trends before independence. Words, after all, 
are cheap and the tem ptations once in power, 
great. The d ivid ing lines between the two are 
fuzzed: not all the “ le ft” live modestly, and 
living mootfStly is not a sign necessarily of 
radicalism.
But in most cases there has been a decisive 
clash between the two trends soon after 
independence, o r both co-exist and struggle 
under a bonapartist chief. The bonapartist 
ch ief can also qu ick ly  come down on the side 
of the right: Kenyatta in Kenya, and Banda in 
Malawi spring readily to  mind.
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T h e  “ l e f t ”  has  th e  a d v a n ta g e  o f 
understanding the problem: in th e  Third World 
neo-colonia l developm ent offers no “ national” 
solution, a lthough it can of course provide a 
very lucrative “ personal” so lu tion to the elite. 
The question the “ le ft” must answer - which 
way forward to escape from neo-colonia lism  - 
remains d ifficu lt fo r them to resolve, however.
Thus, the “ le ft" is like ly to  divide again, into a 
s tr ic tly  “ Nasserist” w ing, w hich wants to 
maintain the status quo of a nationalised 
economy, but envisages no ideological 
developm ent o r real mass m obilisation and 
organisation, and a “ m arx is t-len in is t” w ing, 
which does want to  go in th is d irection.
Such a “ m arx is t-len in is t” w ing is like ly to 
develop from  a recognition of Nasserism's 
Ach illes ’ heel. Nasserism borrows from  the 
p ra c t ic e  o f “ c o m m u n is t ”  re g im e s  a 
nationalised econom y and a one-party state, 
led by a “socia lis t” party. But it rejects 
“ c o m m u n is m ” , n o t b e c a u s e  o f th e  
bureaucratic d ic ta torsh ip  it has meant in so 
many countries, but because the Nasserist 
bureaucracy has still strong ideological and 
cultura l links w ith trad itiona l and capita list 
ideology.
This applies particu la rly  where religion is 
strong. This “ ideological baggage", unless 
overcome, leads to a continua l rebirth of the 
pro-bourgeois, reactionary w ing of the 
bureaucracy, from  w ith in  the “ Nasserist” wing 
itself.
Time after time, conspiracies erupt between 
new ly-em erging right w ings w ith in the 
bureaucracy and the dispossessed local 
bourgeoisie, the old right w ing bureaucrats 
and imperialism. This does not necessarily 
mean a coup. Often it means a struggle w ith in 
the bureaucracy fo r positions of power, to  win 
the bonapartist leader over to the new 
rightw ing.
“To make a revo lu tion” fo r the mass of 
peasants and workers is not some socio logical 
“ technical means” of replacing one social 
system by another, but an overwhelm ing 
personal and collective involvem ent fo r the 
firs t time in the ir lives, in making the ir own 
history, of figh ting  and dying fo r a cause that is 
really the ir own.
In a nationalist revolution w hich does not 
have a conscious socialist goal, at least in thfe 
long term, the masses sacrifice fo r an almost 
mystical ideal, w ith in  the fram ework of old, 
trad itiona l values, re lig ious or otherwise.
W hile national revolutions (such as the 
A lgerian) involved the masses to an enormous 
extent, and there is an instinctive push towards 
such a revolution “ grow ing over" in to  a 
socialist revolution, mass involvement and 
experience is much less than in a national 
revolution w ith socia lis t goals (as, fo r 
example, in Vietnam).
In C uba, how ever, a re v o lu tio n a ry  
nationalist leadership, seizing power from  a 
corrup t neo-colonia l puppet regime, speedily 
advanced from revolutionary nationalism to a 
m arxist-lenin ist position, shedding each time 
it confronted im perialism  different layers of 
the bureaucracy, including some of the 
revolution ’s main leaders. The refusal of 
imperialism to accept radical reforms, even 
though these did not question the total 
capita list nature of the state or society, drove 
the leadership to the left, educating it in the 
process, to a socia list revolution. The process, 
in v o lv in g  a rm e d  c o n f r o n ta t io n  w ith  
imperialism, also deeply involved the masses.
The Dem ocratic People’s Republic of 
Yemen (Aden) won independence after a 
guerrilla  struggle led by a revolutionary 
nationalist leadership c la im ing to be marxist- 
leninist. It has, from inform ation available, 
travelled far along the Cuban road.
In Somalia, there was no revolutionary 
n a t io n a l s t r u g g le  fo r  in d e p e n d e n c e  
comparable w ith that in Yemen or Cuba. A 
m ilitary coup brought to  power officers who 
claimed to be m arxist-leninists. They carried 
through thorough-go ing  nationalisation, and 
appear in cond itions of extreme drought, to  be 
handling the threatened fam ine well, and at the 
same time proceeding w ith a radical cu ltura l 
revolution.
S im ilarly, in Algeria, if the leftw ing of the 
FLN had won the post-independence struggle, 
not only w ould A lgeria have had great claims 
to be a Cuba in North Africa, but may even 
have shown an advance in real socialist 
democracy, compared w ith existing “ socialist 
countries” .
Of course, these few examples serve as a 
w arning against any attem pt to apply a cast- 
iron schema on the ir orig ins and evolution. 
What we are attem pting to do here is look at 
the general trends apparent in all o f them, to 
varying degrees and w ith d ifferent emphases, 
to place them w ith in  a general theoretical 
framework w hich can on ly serve as a rough 
g u id e  to  ana lyse  p a rt ic u la r , c o n c re te  
examples.
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Such regimes have emerged in a unique 
h istorica l s ituation; unique that is, in the 
evolution conceived by Marx and Lenin. For 
the key to w orld socialism  was seen in 
revolution in Europe and the United States. 
The expectation was correct; the ir vision of 
what success there would mean to the w orld, 
even more so. But the revolution, developing 
in the periphery (Third W orld) is now return ing 
to the centre (Europe - fo r example, Portugal).
The delay of the European revolution is ot 
course one of the principal causes fo r the 
grow th of bureaucratic d ic ta torsh ip  in those 
c o u n tr ie s  w h ic h  have had a s o c ia lis t 
revolution. The delay has resulted in the 
econom ic-m ilita ry  grow th of the Soviet bloc 
and China.
Im perialism  is immensely weakened, and 
particu la rly  post-Vietnam , is almost paralysed 
in terms of d irect m ilitary intervention. It must 
therefore rely on favouring its stooges and 
a llie d  c lasses in the  u n d e r-d e v e lo p e d  
countries themselves, or more recently, on 
allies in neighbouring countries. Im perialism  
has now a strategy of developing powerful 
m ilita ry  stooges, such as Iran and Brazil, to  act 
as gendarme in the ir regions.
But once  a re v o lu tio n a ry  n a tio n a lis t 
leadership installs itself in power, even such 
ind irect m ilita ry  intervention is very d ifficu lt. If 
a revo lu tionary nationalist regime destroys 
classes allied w ith imperialism  in terna lly  and is 
able to resist any outside in tervention from  
another ne ighbouring pro-im peria list regime, 
it is in a good position to survive, a lthough, as 
already pointed out, w ith in  the bureaucracy 
restoration ist tendencies continua lly  arise, 
posing new threats.
Marxists are, of course, not only concerned 
about the overthrow  o f capitalism , but the 
emergence of socia list dem ocracy based on 
w orkers’ self-m anagem ent and avoidance of 
bureaucratic d icta torsh ip . One party rule, a 
bonapartist leadership, and the lack o f mass 
partic ipation in a socia list revolution, do not 
meet the crite ria  fo r socia list democracy, if the 
term is to have any meaning.
A m e rica n  im p e ria lis m , m o reove r, so 
pressed by other revolutionary "ho t spots” 
must find  countries like Somalia and the PDR 
of Yemen of m inor concern, given the ir under­
development, paucity of valuable resources, 
and small population. This gives these regimes 
additiona l opportun ities fo r survival and 
forward development.
Some traditional com m unist parties have 
adopted a strategy of w ork ing  w ith in the 
Nasserist regimes. This has not necessarily 
been w ith the goal of a socia list revolutionary 
outcome, but often of an a lliance to advance 
“ on the non-capita lis t road” or fo r “tru ly  
independent regimes” etc. and often in 
response to the degree of close d ip lom atic  ties 
w ith the Soviet Union and/or China.
In Nasser’s Egypt, trad itiona l com m unists 
entered the regime, m ainly after the “ Socialist 
Laws" in 1961 which nationalised the local and 
foreign bourgeoisie and carried th rough a 
relatively radical land reform
Faced w ith a choice between im prisonm ent, 
exile o r the extreme d ifficu lty  of bu ild ing a real 
mass base among people enthusiastica lly 
supporting Nasser, and, on the other hand, 
working w ith in the regime, com m unists chose 
the latter.
In Indonesia, the PKI after the fa ilu re  of the 
Madiun uprising, faced a s im ila r quandary. 
A lthough having greater possib ilities of 
oppositional organisation, it chose to work 
w ith in  the confines o f the Sukarno regime, 
which in domestic po litics was certa in ly  far 
less radical than Nasser’s.
In Cambodia, Kh ieuSam phanand h is fe llow  
com m unists chose, at first, a s im ilar route: 
they worked w ith in  the pre-1970 Sihanouk 
regime. But once they suffered the ir firs t (and 
by other standards, relatively m inor) defeat at 
the hands of Lon Nol and the righ t w ith in  the 
Sihanouk regime in 1967, they turned to an 
alternative, and in the long run far more 
successful politica l strategy.
In these three countries the local ru ling class 
and the educated elite were relatively strong, 
entrenched by the ir role as the pre-colonial 
ruling class, by a long colonia l tutelage and by 
a h istory of ru ling class po litica l organisation 
which gave it a strong sense of national self- 
identity.
In countries such as Somalia, DPR of Yemen 
and Tanzania, however, where the traditional 
rulers were weak, social organisation was 
v irtua lly tribal, and colonia lism  had done little  
in the way of econom ic developm ent o r even 
explo itation, the task of individual m arxist- 
revolutionaries appeared much more d ifficu lt, 
given the ir smallness in size, lack of an 
organisation w ith roots, the popularity of the 
regime, and its radical measures, w ith hope of 
them becoming even more radical. In such a 
situation, the tem ptation to w ork w ith in the
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regime as its m arx is t-len in is t left w ing is very 
great.
But such activ ity is prone to ideological 
degeneration. For responsib ility  must be taken 
fo r the regime’s acts, fo r com prom ises made, 
fo r a certain isolation from  the masses 
because of h o ld in g  a p o s it io n  in the  
bureaucracy, often in the top  or m iddle layers. 
So much, too, depends on the whims or 
goodw ill of the bonapartist leader who may go 
along w ith the left, even become a Castro, but 
who may equally go w ith the right.
For these m arxist-leninists, it is a constant 
battle, requiring a strong adherence to 
principle, but also extreme flex ib ility . Yet if 
they refuse to work w ith in  the regime, they 
face isolation, exile, o r sim ply a non-po litica l 
professional career.
CONCLUSION
For “ Nasserist” regimes, therefore, a general 
defin ition m ight be: in Third W orld countries, 
where the landlords, local bourgeoisie and 
imperialism have lost all key posts in the 
economy, through nationalisation as a result 
of a coup or evolution of a radical nationalist 
bureaucracy, the regime w hich emerges rests 
power, both po litica lly  and econom ically, in 
the hands of the state bureaucracy, which 
however maintains much of its traditional 
ideological baggage.
This state bureaucracy attem pts to develop 
a m odern  s ta te  by us in g  m echan ism s 
borrowed from the Soviet or China blocs. But 
w ith in this bureaucracy, ruled by a bonapartist 
arbiter, a clash emerges between the wing w ith 
bourgeois ambitions, and those who seek to 
carry on the m odernising task on the basis of a 
n a tio n a lis e d  e co n o m y . If th is  w in g  is 
victorious, it is liable to divide into two groups - 
one to maintain the purely nationalist 
“ Nasserist” road, and another which sees the 
weaknesses and fa ilings of such a road, as it 
breeds constantly new restoration ist forces 
w ith in the bureaucracy who ally themselves 
with imperialism  fo r counter-revo lu tion.
This second group of the bureaucracy turns 
to “ m arxism -lenin ism " to resolve the problem 
of mass m obilisation and the severe lim ita tions 
imposed by trad itiona l ideology. But it remains 
restricted w ith in  the confines of the Nasserist 
bureaucracy; o r if it takes power, still finds 
itself restricted by its orig ins, by the continued 
presence of s tric tly  Nasserist elements, and by 
the d ifficu lty  of m obilis ing su ffic ien t mass 
activ ity and organisation to proceed fu lly  on 
the “ Cuban road” , to  a com plete socia list 
transform ation of society.
Such “ m arx is t-len in is t” groups, however, 
are exceptions at present, particu la rly  in 
societies where strong class forces are 
present.
In general, “ Nasserist" bureaucracies are 
likely to be seen h is to rica lly  as trans ito ry  
regimes which have gone beyond capita lism  
but have not the internal dynam ic to take them 
to a fu lly  com pleted socia list revolution. They 
are products of the h istorica l delay of the 
World Revolution in its crucia l centres: West 
Europe and the United States.
For revolutionary marxists, the question of 
whether to work w ith in  such regimes or to 
organise outside and build a revolutionary 
m arxist-lenin ist party, is a real and d ifficu lt 
one. It cannot be resolved by some general 
theoretical form ulation, but only by a very 
concrete, h istorica l analysis of the particu la r 
situation, w ith in  the w orld context.
W orking w ith in  such regimes is fu ll of 
da nge rs , p a r t ic u la r ly  w hen an a lre a d y  
prepared cadre force linked w ith the masses 
does not exist. If, however, there is no other 
way, then such an orientation may be valid, 
p ro v id e d  it keeps a lw ays in m ind  the 
possib ility of the Khieu Samphan alternative: 
of leaving the regime at a given point, and 
turn ing to d irect organisation of the party, or 
re v o lu tio n a ry  fro n t, p o s s ib ly  in c lu d in g  
guerrilla  warfare. In other words, work w ith in  
such regimes must be seen as a tactic  w ith in  a 
much broader perspective, and not a total 
strategy in itself.
